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MERGER SETTLEMENT AND ENFORCEMENT
POLICY FOR OPTIMAL DETERRENCE AND
MAXIMUM WELFARE
Steven C. Salop*
Merger enforcement today relies on settlements more than litigation to
resolve anticompetitive concerns. The impact of settlement policy on
welfare and the proper goals of settlement policy are highly controversial.
Some argue that gun-shy agencies settle for too little, while others argue
that agencies use their power to delay to extract overreaching settlement
terms, even when mergers are not welfare reducing. This Article uses
decision theory to throw light on this controversy. The goal of this Article
is to formulate and analyze agency merger enforcement and settlement
commitment policies in the face of imperfect information, litigation costs,
and delay risks by the merging parties, agencies, and the courts. The
Article explains why limiting the goal of merger enforcement and agency
settlement policy simply to avoid welfare harms, but nothing more, is
flawed as a matter of both law and policy and would compromise
deterrence. The decision-theoretic analysis distinguishes two types of
agency commitment policies: a short-run optimal policy that focuses only
the specific merger proposal being evaluated and a long-run optimal policy
that takes into account effects on future mergers and deterrence goals. The
short-run optimal policy may lead to some welfare-reducing settlements by
a rationally gun-shy agency; settlement demands for weakly welfareenhancing merger proposals, what might be called “exacting tribute”; and
“anti-deterrence” effects by merging firms proposing some mergers with
greater welfare harm in order to increase settlement bargaining leverage.
In contrast, a disciplined long-run optimal policy would clear all welfareenhancing mergers as proposed; forgo negative welfare settlements despite
the risk of losing in court, but instead demand settlements on welfarereducing merger proposals sufficient to lead to strict welfare increases (not
just welfare neutrality), relative to no merger; and avoid anti-deterrence by
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demanding larger settlements for more harmful mergers. While these latter
provisions might be controversial as a political matter, they support
deterrence. Demanding only welfare-neutral settlements would lead to
under-deterrence. Deterrence also would be improved if last-minute
voluntary divestiture agreements were not treated as part of the merger
agreement evaluated by the court, contrary to the approach taken in Arch
Coal and other cases.
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INTRODUCTION
Mergers are the central focus of civil antitrust enforcement by
governmental antitrust agencies. Almost all proposed mergers in the United
States are cleared as proposed. For example, fewer than 3 percent of the
mergers that were reported under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act (HSR) process in 1999–2011 in the United States
received second requests, and about 30 percent of these are cleared as
proposed. Most of the rest were settled by consent decree or voluntary
restructuring. Some are abandoned by the parties in response to agency
settlement demands or threats of litigation. Only a few were litigated in
court. As noted in Table 1, fewer than 2 percent of mergers that received
second requests reached an adjudicated judgment.
Because of the low percentage of adjudicated cases, merger enforcement
has been characterized as a regulatory system, rather than law
enforcement.1 Of course, this is an overstatement. Most law enforcement
systems involve plea bargaining with few cases actually going to trial.2 A
high settlement rate is not surprising in light of the cost and uncertainty of
litigation. Merger settlements do not simply have the goals of economizing
on litigation costs, achieving certainty, and preventing delays. Settlements
should also serve two overarching policy goals: (i) preventing specific
mergers from lessening competition, while preserving welfare benefits; and
(ii) deterring future anticompetitive mergers. Achieving these twin
enforcement goals in an efficient way requires careful analysis.
Achieving these goals is complicated by the fact that merger analysis
Agency competitive-effects analysis
involves inherent uncertainty.3
typically occurs before the merger is consummated in a fairly short period
of time on the basis of limited information. If the agency predicts that the
merger likely will reduce welfare, it must defend its prediction to a judge
who generally is not an antitrust expert. This means that agency settlement
demands and settlement negotiations are tightly connected to litigation; a
breakdown in the negotiations is the precursor to trial. Settlement demands
also must take into account the potential for errors by the agencies and the
courts.

1. See, e.g., A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust: The New Regulation, 10 ANTITRUST 13,
13 (1995); see also Spencer W. Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature of
Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383, 1385–86 (1998); Michael L. Weiner, Antitrust
and the Rise of the Regulatory Consent Decree, 10 ANTITRUST 4 (1995).
2. See George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 54 (1984).
3. Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Evaluating Merger Enforcement During the
Obama Administration, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 28 (2012), http://www.stanford
lawreview.org/merger-enforcement-obama-administration; Ken Heyer, A World of
Uncertainty: Economics and the Globalization of Antitrust, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 375
(2005); Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Merger Analysis and the Treatment of
Uncertainty: Should We Expect Better?, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 537, 538 (2007).
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This means that a key merger policy issue is the appropriate settlement
demand.4 The current posture of the agencies has generated great
controversy. Some argue that the agencies are overreaching in their
settlement demands, while others argue that the agencies are gun-shy and
too readily accept welfare-reducing settlements in order to avoid the risk of
litigation. For example, Joe Sims and Michael McFalls conclude that the
agency settlement regime has led to bureaucratic overreaching that harms
consumers and the merging parties.5 They suggest that the government has
the upper hand in settlement negotiations because of its power to delay the
resolution of the merger. According to Sims and McFalls, agencies use this
delay power to demand excessive divestitures, what might be characterized
as “extracting tribute.” To prevent this harmful overaggressiveness, Sims
and McFalls suggest that the agencies instead should adopt a policy based
on what they call the “principle of minimal intrusion,” that is, the minimal
divestiture necessary to prevent welfare harm, relative to the no-merger
outcome.6 Thomas Barnett, the Department of Justice’s Assistant Attorney
General during the second George W. Bush Administration, expresses a
similar goal.7
In contrast, Lawrence Frankel concludes that the design of the
enforcement system leads to systematic underenforcement and excessive
false negatives.8 According to Frankel, the agencies have weaker
bargaining leverage caused by informational disadvantages, the need to
carry the burden of proof in court—where decisions are reviewed by
generalist judges—and a fear of losing in court. He notes that the agencies
settle for divestitures that leave consumers worse off.9

4. For an overview of settlement policy, see Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, FTC, The
Nature and Limits of Restructuring in Merger Review, Remarks at Cutting Edge Antitrust
Conference (Feb. 17, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/restruct.htm.
For a discussion of achieving effective divestitures, see William J. Baer & Ronald C.
Redcay, Solving Competition Problems in Merger Control: The Requirements for an
Effective Divestiture Remedy, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 915 (2001).
5. Joe Sims & Michael McFalls, Negotiated Merger Remedies: How Well Do They
Solve Competition Problems, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 932, 938 (2001); see also Melamed,
supra note 1, at 13; Joe Sims & Deborah P. Herman, The Effect of Twenty Years of HartScott-Rodino on Merger Practice: A Case Study in the Law of Unintended Consequences
Applied to Antitrust Legislation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 865, 899 (1997).
6. Sims & McFalls, supra note 5, at 933.
7. Thomas O. Barnett, Current Issues in Merger Enforcement: Thoughts on Theory,
Litigation Practice, and Retrospectives, Remarks at the Lewis Bernstein Memorial Lecture
(June 26, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/234537.htm (“We
don’t propose more than is needed—we don’t attempt to create bargaining chips. We simply
propose the remedy we believe is appropriate.”).
8. Lawrence M. Frankel, The Flawed Institutional Design of U.S. Merger Review:
Stacking the Deck Against Enforcement, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 159, 190.
9. On the basis of a number of retrospective studies, Weinberg concludes that there has
been underenforcement. Matthew Weinberg, The Price Effect of Horizontal Mergers,
4 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 433, 434 (2008). For a similar view, see Heyer, supra note 3, at
383.
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The goal of this Article is to analyze these issues through a decisiontheoretic lens. It focuses on the role of imperfect information and litigation
costs in driving optimal enforcement and settlement policy.10 This Article
does not analyze the form or structure of the remedy.11 Instead, it focuses
on the appropriate aggressiveness of agency settlement and enforcement
strategy. This Article assumes that the goal of merger policy is to
maximize expected welfare.12
This analysis involves a number of related questions: Should the
agencies ever offer or accept settlements, rather than adopting a “just say
no” stance to anticompetitive mergers and litigating them all, while clearing
all procompetitive mergers as proposed? Assuming that settlements are
made, how strong a settlement should the agencies demand? Should the
agencies refuse any settlement that involves a reduction in welfare, relative
to the no-merger level, even if they face a risk of losing in court? Should
the agencies ever demand settlements that lead to a level of welfare strictly

10. These issues have been studied by a number of other economists, beginning with
Stigler’s seminal work on the impact of U.S. enforcement on the number and composition of
mergers. See George Stigler, The Economic Effects of the Antitrust Laws, 9 J.L. & ECON. 225
(1966); see also Robin Aaronson, Do Companies Take Any Notice of Competition policy?, 2
CONSUMER POL’Y REV. 140 (1992); Jo Seldeslachts et al., Settle for Now but Block for
Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools, 52 J.L. & ECON. 607, 607
(2009).
11. Most recently, there has been consideration of when (if at all) the agencies should
use behavioral remedies instead of divestitures or other structural remedies. See DOJ & FTC,
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (Aug. 19, 2010) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf. For a recent
interesting commentary, see Ken Heyer, Optimal Remedies for Anticompetitive Mergers, 26
ANTITRUST 26 (2012).
12. Elsewhere I have concluded that the relevant antitrust standard is true consumer
welfare. See Steven C. Salop, Question: What is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare
Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336,
336 (2010). However, the analysis of settlements in this Article also would apply to other
economic welfare standards. The key assumption I am making is that merger settlements
will fall in the range where the settlement will increase welfare and decrease profits. For
further discussion of the proper welfare measure, see Robert H. Lande, Chicago’s False
Foundation: Wealth Transfers (Not Just Efficiency) Should Guide Antitrust, 58 ANTITRUST
L.J. 631 (1989). For a defense of the total welfare standard, see Ken Heyer, Welfare
Standards and Merger Analysis: Why Not the Best?, 2 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 29, 29
(2006). Note also the economics literature that shows that agencies with an overarching goal
of maximizing aggregate welfare nonetheless might commit to use a consumer welfare
standard in merger enforcement when negotiating with the merging parties. These models
also discuss merger policy and deterrence more generally. See Mark Armstrong & John
Vickers, A Model of Delegated Project Choice, 78 ECONOMETRICA 213 (2010); David Besanko &
Daniel F. Spulber, Contested Mergers and Equilibrium Antitrust Policy, 9 J.L. ECON. ORG. 1,
1 (1993); Joseph Farrell, Negotiation and Merger Remedies: Some Problems, in
MERGER REMEDIES IN AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN UNION COMPETITION POLICY 95 (Howard
Shelanski & Francois Leveque eds., 2003); Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, The
Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust, 2 C OMPETITION P OL ’ Y I NT ’ L 2 (2006);
Sven-Olof Fridolfsson, A Consumer Surplus Defense in Merger Control, in T HE
P OLITICAL E CONOMY OF A NTITRUST 287 (V. Ghosal & J. Stennek eds., 2007); Damien J.
Neven & Lars-Hendrik Röller, Consumer Surplus vs. Welfare Standard in a
Political Economy Model of Merger Control , 23 I NT ’ L J. I NDUS . O RG . 829 (2005).
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above the no-merger level? Should the agencies negotiate settlements or
just make nonnegotiable, take-it-or-leave-it settlement demands? Should
the agencies accept eleventh hour voluntary divestiture offers?
This Article uses decision theory to formulate “optimal” agency
settlement policy under two alternative assumptions. It first formulates a
“short run” optimal policy that focuses only the specific merger proposal
being evaluated and does not take deterrence into account. It then
formulates a superior “long run” optimal policy that takes into account
effects on future mergers and deterrence goals.13 It also evaluates the
competing claims about agency behavior in the context of the optimal
policies.
The analysis reaches a number of conclusions. The optimal short-run
and long-run policies are very different. The short-run optimal policy may
lead to some welfare-reducing settlements by a rationally gun-shy agency.
It also may involve exacting tribute by settlement demands for weak
welfare-enhancing merger proposals. It also may cause unintended “antideterrence,” whereby some merging firms propose mergers with greater
potential welfare harm in order to increase their settlement bargaining
leverage. In contrast, a disciplined long-run optimal policy would clear all
welfare-enhancing mergers as proposed. It also would forgo negative
welfare settlements despite the risk of losing in court, but instead demand
settlements on welfare-reducing merger proposals sufficient to lead to
overall welfare increases (not just welfare neutrality), relative to no merger.
While demanding such welfare-enhancing settlements for harmful mergers
might be politically controversial, it serves the fundamental deterrence
goals of antitrust. Demanding only welfare-neutral settlements would lead
to under-deterrence. Anti-deterrence would be avoided by demanding
larger settlements for more harmful mergers. Deterrence also would be
improved if last-minute voluntary divestiture agreements were not treated
as part of the merger agreement evaluated by the court, contrary to the
approach taken in Arch Coal and other cases.
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part I sets out the
basic analytic framework and the formal model used. To fix the ideas, Part
II explains that the proper standard for merger enforcement is welfare
maximization, subject to the constraints imposed by practicality and
deterrence. Part III analyzes the agency’s short-run optimal settlement
commitment strategy when there are nontrivial litigation costs for the firm
and imperfect information provided by the agency, parties, and the court.
Part IV analyzes the properties of the optimal long-run deterrence strategy.
The conclusion discusses several possible extensions of this analysis. The
Appendix contains a technical model of the basic issues and the short run
optimal policy.

13. Long-run optimization also could take into account the impact on legal standards and
future judicial decisions.
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I. BASIC ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
This Article uses decision theory to formulate optimal merger
enforcement and settlement policy under the HSR process in the United
States and the analogous regulatory process in other countries. It analyzes
two types of agency settlement and enforcement strategies: (i) a short-run
optimal policy, which assumes that the agency evaluates each merger
proposal on its own, without regard to any possible impact of its decision
on future merger proposals, and (ii) a long-run optimal policy, which
assumes that the agency does take into account the impact of its decisions
on future merger proposals.
The long-run optimal policy differs
substantially from the short-run policy. By including long-run deterrence
effects into its analysis, the long-run policy better protects consumer
welfare. It also resolves a number of the commentators’ criticisms of
current agency policy.
This analysis involves an understanding of the incentives of the agencies
and the merging parties to settle cases rather than litigate. The analysis of
settlement incentives involves an understanding of the costs and benefits of
litigation versus settlement for the agencies and the merging parties. These
depend, in turn, on the impact of the transaction on welfare and
profitability, as well as on imperfect information and litigation costs. They
also depend on expectations of the outcome in court, including the fact that
the courts also suffer from imperfect information. Design of optimal longrun enforcement policy also involves an understanding of how the agencies’
settlement demands and settlement negotiations affect deterrence, that is,
how they affect future merger proposals. Because settlements are
negotiated in the shadow of the law, it also is necessary to link settlement
behavior to the legal standards and to the behavior of courts.14
A. The Importance of Settlements in Merger Enforcement
It is clear that settlement is a key aspect of the merger review and
enforcement process. Settlements permit mergers to proceed expeditiously
and achieve cognizable efficiencies, while reducing or eliminating market
power concerns.15 In fact, most mergers that raise competitive concerns
settle, rather than go to court. Table 1 provides basic merger U.S.
enforcement outcomes data for 1999–2011.16 Fewer than 2 percent of
mergers that received second requests reached an adjudicated judgment.
14. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1979).
15. See Heyer, supra note 12.
16. For similar statistics, see Frankel, supra note 8, at 162–63 (2008), and the references
cited therein. See also Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger
Enforcement, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK 235, 244 (Robert Pitofsky
ed., 2008); Baker & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 28; Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro,
Reinvigorated Merger Enforcement in the Obama Administration, ANTITRUST &
COMPETITION POL’Y BLOG (June 25, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
antitrustprof_blog/2012/06/reinvigorated-merger-enforcement-in-the-obama-
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Of course, these results likely would have been different if the agency
settlement policy and behavior were different. Thus, understanding
settlement behavior and formulating sensible policy is a key component of
merger enforcement policy. This Article is a step in that direction.
Table 1: Outcomes of HSR Filings17

Year
201119

Reported

Second
Requests

Challenged
Restructure Abandoned

2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003

1,414
1,128
684
1,656
2,108
1,746
1,610
1,377
968

58
46
31
41
63
45
50
35
35

36
35
29
35
32
30
17
24
33

2002

1,142

49

200120

2,237

70

2000
1999

4,749
4,340

Total
% of total
filings
% of Second
Requests

4
2
5
7
6
2
1
3

7
12
3
7
9
4
5
17

19
24
15
26
16
15
11
15
13

2
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0

2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
0

31

5

12

13

0

1

55

20

8

26

1

0

98
111

79
76

16
16

26
23

36
37

1
0

0
0

25,159

732

512

94

139

266

5

7

100.0%

2.9%
70.0%

12.8%

19.0%

36.3%

0.7%

1.0%

100.0%

13 total

Challenges18
Adjudicated
Adjudicated
Consent
Cases Won at Cases Lost at
Decrees
judgment
judgment

administration.html; Daniel A. Crane, Has the Obama Justice Department Reinvigorated
Antitrust Enforcement?, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 13, 16 (July 18, 2012), http://www.
stanfordlawreview.org/online/obama-antitrust-enforcement.
17. Table does not include non-HSR challenges.
18. The difference between Restructuring and Consent Decrees is whether the complaint
was filed. Restructuring indicates altering the transaction without the government filing a
formal complaint, while a consent decree entails settlement occurring after either the
commencement of litigation or agency proceedings.
19. For 2011, the FTC stated that its seventeen challenges have resulted in nine consent
decrees, three judicial proceedings (FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003
(2013) (pending following reversal and remand); FTC v. Promedica Health System, Inc., No.
3:11 CV 47, 2011 WL 1219281 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2011) (win); FTC v. Lab. Corp. of
Am., No. 11-55293 (9th Cir. Mar. 14, 2011) (loss)), and five abandon/restructures. The five
abandon/restructure cases are nonpublic and cannot be categorized any further. The
Commission’s counterpart, the DOJ, entered into eleven consent decrees, one merger was
abandoned (United States v. AT&T, No. 11-01560 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 31, 2011)), one
merger was blocked at trial (United States. v. H&R Block, Inc., No. 11-00948 (D.D.C. Oct.
31, 2011)), and seven other transactions were restructured. For purposes of calculating the
percentages, all five FTC cases were allocated to the abandoned column based on the FTC’s
statistical average from the 1999–2010 period of having an abandon-to-restructure ratio of
eighty-three to five.
20. In February 2001, the HSR reporting rules changed, resulting in a substantial
reduction in the number of mergers that required HSR filings. Pub. L. No. 106-553, § 630,
114 Stat. 2762 (2000).
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B. Imperfect Information, Litigation Costs, and Delay
Merger review takes place in an environment of inherent uncertainty and
litigation costs. Settlements are struck through negotiation, in which
bargaining leverage is important. The key to understanding the bargaining
leverage of the two sides involves several factors: the impact of the merger
on welfare and profitability, the relative litigation and delay costs of the two
sides, their information and risk aversion, their reputational costs and
benefits of litigation, and the behavior of the courts.21
The impact of the consummation of the transaction on welfare and
profitability clearly is a paramount factor. The agencies are tasked with
protecting competition and maximizing welfare. The merging firms are
concerned with maximizing shareholder value. Another key factor is
relative litigation costs. For the merging firms, delay costs and uncertainty
are likely more significant than out-of-pocket litigation costs, except
perhaps for small transactions.22 Delays raise costs for several reasons.23
First, litigation delays the consummation of the transaction and
achievement of the increased value. Second, delays lead to uncertainty that
obviously makes it risky for the merging firms to move forward with their
business plans and strategies during the interim until the matter is resolved.
This may not be primarily an issue of risk aversion but rather a matter of
not wanting to waste investments. In addition, delays can lead to the loss of
key managers of the acquired firm, who do not know if they will be retained
after the merger.
Finally, and perhaps most important, delays increase the likelihood that
the merger will fail to be consummated at all, even aside from the legal
risks. It is commonly said that “time is the enemy of the deal” and the
situation is no different for merger transactions. During the period of delay,
market conditions and strategies may change, so that the merger may no
longer be in the interest of one of the parties or might create the potential
for opportunism. Because delays put the entire value of the transaction at
risk, they provide strong incentives to settle quickly.
If the merging firms’ litigation and delay costs are large, the agency
would gain a significant bargaining advantage. It could anticipate that its
settlement demand is more likely to be accepted by the merging firms to
21. For a dealmaker’s view of negotiation dynamics, see JAMES C. FREUND, SMART
NEGOTIATING: HOW TO MAKE GOOD DEALS IN THE REAL WORLD (1993); see also ROGER
FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN
99 (1981). The economic analysis of bargaining is based on the Nash bargaining solution
and Nash sequential bargaining equilibrium. See John Nash, The Bargaining Problem, 18
ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950); see also Ken Binmore et al., The Nash Bargaining Solution in
Economic Modeling, 17 RAND J. ECON. 176 (1986).
22. For large matters, out-of-pocket costs probably will be small relative to the
incremental value of the merger. That incremental value is equal to the net present value of
future profits less the cost of the acquisition.
23. The magnitude of these delay costs is more likely to be a proportion of the
incremental value of the merger, rather than being a fixed cost that does not vary with the
size of the transaction.
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avoid further delays.24 This anticipation might lead the agency to demand a
more intrusive settlement.
The agencies also may have litigation costs. First, the agencies have
limited budgets, which could create opportunity costs. However, it is not
clear how significant these opportunity costs are. Budgets are sufficient for
litigation on the current scale and likely would be increased if litigation
intensity increased over time. The agencies also may have negative
opportunity costs in that litigation experience provides valuable staff
training and beneficial credentials. However, the agencies likely do face
significant capacity constraints during limited periods of merger booms or
when an administration wants to quickly ramp up litigation intensity.25
The agencies are also sensitive to their win-loss records in court. The
agencies appear concerned that critics will interpret losses in court as
agency overreaching, bad judgment, or incompetence. The agencies also
may want to avoid losses to maintain staff morale. There also could be
possible adverse deterrence effects from losses in court. A loss in court
could change the law and thereby alter the agency’s future litigation
prospects. All of these factors create “opportunity costs” for the agencies
that could make them “gun shy” about bringing cases instead of reaching a
settlement, even if the settlement leads to a welfare reduction.26 As
discussed below, these concerns arguably are overstated, if not entirely
unfounded.27
C. The Determinants of Settlement Behavior
Imperfect information is central to this analysis. We assume that all three
participants (the agency, the firms, and the court) face imperfect
information about welfare. We assume that the agency can accurately
estimate the expected welfare impact, in the sense of having unbiased
estimates. However, those estimates involve some unavoidable uncertainty
regarding the ultimate actual welfare impact. For example, even if the

24. Sims & McFalls, supra note 5, at 938 (focusing on the agency’s ability to inflict
delay costs on the firm as the primary reason for the agency’s bargaining leverage).
25. For example, as noted in Table 1, comparing the merger wave of 2000 to the more
modest merger activity in 2011, the second request rate was about 2 percent in 2000 versus 4
percent in 2011. There also were more transactions adjudicated in 2011.
26. For example, the DOJ’s loss in the Oracle merger litigation has been said to have led
to its scaling back its enforcement of unilateral effects. See Baker & Shapiro, supra note 3, at
32–33; James A. Keyte, United States v. H&R Block: The DOJ Invokes Brown Shoe To
Shed the Oracle Albatross, 26 ANTITRUST 32, 32 (2012) (“[T]he desire for a litigated win in
the shadow of Oracle had become palpable in the hallways of the Antitrust Division.”); Scott
A. Sher & Andrea Agathoklis Murino, Unilateral Effects in Technology Markets: Oracle,
H&R Block, and What It All Means, 26 ANTITRUST 46, 46 (2012) (“[T]he DOJ’s recent
victory in H&R Block has reinvigorated a mode of unilateral effects analysis that had been
seriously undermined when the DOJ lost the Oracle case.” (citations omitted)).
27. See infra Part IV.B.
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estimate of expected welfare impact is positive, it is possible that the
merger actually could cause welfare to fall, or vice versa.28
In the United States, the enforcement agencies do not have carte blanche
to order divestitures or other changes to the structure of the merger.
Instead, settlements are negotiated in the shadow of the legal standards for
liability under section 7 of the Clayton Act.29 A court will reject a proposed
merger if and only if it concludes that the expectation is that the merger will
be welfare reducing, relative to the no-merger alternative.30
We assume that the court has no information that the agency lacks.31 For
simplicity, we also assume that the parties and the agency agree about the
welfare impact of the settlement.32 We assume that the court is generally
less informed and less expert than the agency. We thus will assume for
simplicity that the court has made an erroneous finding (false acquittal), if
and when it rules against an agency that challenges a merger that the agency
believes will reduce welfare.33 While this assumption clearly is not always
true, and is also not essential for the conclusions drawn, it serves as a useful
abstraction to simplify the analysis. However, we will assume that the
court’s decisions are not perverse. That is, we assume that the court is less
likely to falsely convict if the welfare benefits are larger, and the court is
less likely to falsely acquit if the welfare harms are larger.
In order to estimate the likelihood that its settlement demand will be
accepted by the merging firms, the agency must estimate the firms’
incremental profitability of the merger and their litigation and delay costs,
including delay risks. The firms would have the incentive to accept a
settlement demand that would lead to profits that exceed their expected
profits from litigating. If the agency had perfect information about
28. For example, the agency may expect that the merger either will reduce welfare by
100 or raise it by 40, each with probability of 50 percent, in which case the expected welfare
impact is a welfare reduction of 30 (i.e., 50% x (-100) + 50% x (+40) = -30).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
30. This raises the issue of whether a court should evaluate the merger relative to an
attainable maximum welfare standard rather than a no-merger alternative, as discussed in
more detail below in Part II.B.
31. In the real world, additional information sometimes is developed in preparation for
trial that would change the estimate of the expected welfare. This possibility is ignored in
the analysis here, but could be added.
32. In the real world, the merging firms likely face imperfect information about the
agency’s estimate of the incremental welfare impact of the merger as proposed, as well as
the agency’s estimate of the welfare impact of various alternative structures that might be
offered as settlements. This imperfect information might involve the agency’s analysis of
the cognizability of the claimed efficiencies, as well as market power factors. The firms also
might have imperfect information about the agency’s opportunity costs.
33. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 8, at 174; Sims & Herman, supra note 5, at 898
(“[T]here is no doubt that those at the agencies are more skilled at understanding and
applying complicated economic concepts than the average federal judge or clerk.”). For
an opposing view, see Joshua D. Wright & Angela M. Diveley, Do Expert Agencies
Outperform Generalist Judges? Some Preliminary Evidence from the Federal Trade
Commission, 1 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 1 (2012). However, this Article uses the
decision to appeal as the measure of the likelihood of error. This test assumes that appeals
courts are a more reliable arbiter of the correct outcome.
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profitability, it could tailor a maximal settlement demand that the merging
firms surely would accept. In this way, the agency could also avoid
transactions being abandoned as a result of overreaching settlement
demands, as well as avoid unnecessary litigation. However, we assume that
the agency generally has imperfect information about the firms’
profitability, including their perceived cost and risk of delay.
For much of our analysis, we assume that the agency makes a
nonnegotiable, “take it or leave it” (TIOLI) settlement demand, backed up
by a commitment to litigate if its demand is rejected by the firms.34 We
assume that these demands are made after the agency has reached its
conclusion about the welfare impact of the merger, based on its own
completed investigation, analysis by the parties, and discussions between
the agency and the parties.
Bargaining theory often assumes that negotiators are not able to make
credible TIOLI offers. However, in the case of merger enforcement, the
agency has inherent bargaining advantages that make reputation formation
and commitments more possible. Enforcement decisions are made
repeatedly by the agencies with respect to numerous mergers and those
decisions are accompanied by explanations.35 The agencies also can
reinforce their reputational effects and make their threats more credible
through guidelines, press releases, and speeches.
This assumption that the agency makes nonnegotiable settlement
demands clearly does not describe current agency behavior. The normal
procedure is for the agency and merging parties to negotiate over the details
of a possible settlement, not simply to make threats. Negotiations are used
to exchange relevant information about the potential agreement, explore
common ground, and learn the consequences of failure to reach
agreement.36 These informational benefits may mitigate or even trump the
bargaining power benefits to the agency of committing to making only a
single nonnegotiable offer. However, the assumption that the agency
makes nonnegotiable settlement demands is a useful starting point for our
normative analysis of optimal enforcement policy.

34. Of course, firms have potential bargaining counterstrategies to mitigate or even
reverse the agency’s inherent bargaining leverage. One strategy is a last-minute divestiture
proposal, as discussed in Part IV.E. Firms also can signal a greater (and more credible)
willingness to litigate in various ways—such as by agreeing to a duty to litigate or a large
reverse breakup fee in the acquisition agreement—by preparing their trial strategy and
exhibits in advance or by retaining a law firm with a reputation and taste for litigating. For
an interesting database on reverse termination fees, see Dale Collins, Antitrust Reverse
Termination Fees, ANTITRUST UNPACKED (July 15, 2011), http://www.antitrustunpacked
.com/siteFiles/BlogPosts/005_reverse_breakup_fees1.pdf.
35. A few merging parties are repeat players and they have a similar ability to establish
reputations.
36. See, e.g., FISHER & URY, supra note 21, at 67, 80; FREUND, supra note 21, at 37.
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II. THE WELFARE-MAXIMIZATION STANDARD AND OPTIMAL DETERRENCE
To explicate these concepts, we initially assume that there are no
information imperfections or litigation costs. We assume instead that the
agency and the merging parties both know (and agree on) the welfare
impact and profitability of the merger and possible settlements. We also
assume that the court never errs. Within this simple structure, we analyze
the agency’s settlement commitment strategy and the impact of the strategy
on the behavior of merging firms. This simple scenario also can be used to
explain the benefits of a settlement standard geared toward maximum
welfare, not welfare neutrality.
The overarching goal of the antitrust laws is to maximize welfare. We
consider how this goal should play out for an agency choosing its
settlement policy for potentially anticompetitive mergers. We assume that
the agency makes a nonnegotiable settlement demand. If the firms reject
the settlement demand, the matter goes to litigation, and the court decides
whether or not to block the merger based on the incremental welfare impact
of the merger as proposed. Because the court also has perfect information,
it enjoins the merger if and only if the merger reduces welfare. That is, the
court uses a legal standard of welfare neutrality.
A. The Agency’s Welfare-Maximizing Optimal Settlement Demand
Suppose that there is perfect information and zero litigation costs for all
sides. In this scenario, the agency’s optimal strategy is simple. If the
merger as proposed is welfare enhancing, the agency will clear the merger
as proposed. If the matter were litigated in court, the judge would correctly
find that the merger is welfare enhancing and would reject the agency’s
complaint with certainty. Firms know this fact, so any settlement demand
would be rejected by the firms, which lack litigation and delay costs.
In contrast, if the merger were welfare reducing, the agency would have
complete control. The court would enjoin the merger with certainty if the
matter were litigated. In this situation, the merging firms would accept any
settlement demand for which its incremental profits would remain positive.
Thus, the agency would have the ability and incentive to make the
settlement demand that maximizes welfare, subject only to the constraint
that the firms would rather accept the settlement than abandon the
transaction.
B. The Proper Welfare Benchmark for Merger Enforcement
This ability and incentive of agencies to demand the welfare-maximizing
divestiture raises the policy issue of whether maximum welfare should be
the agency’s goal in settlements. The liability standard is that a merger is
illegal where “the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen
competition.”37 It might be argued that this implies that the agency should
37. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
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limit settlement demands solely to prevent the mergers from reducing
welfare and should not demand settlements that lead to strictly positive
incremental welfare impacts, let alone welfare maximization.38
This argument for welfare neutrality misses the mark for several reasons.
First, the section 7 legal standard applies to judicial decision making, not to
settlements. Settlements are voluntary agreements that are made to avoid
litigation and are not subject to the same standard as for liability.39 In fact,
as discussed below, when there is imperfect information and agency
litigation costs, the agency often will find it optimal to accept some
settlements that lead to welfare reductions to compensate for litigation
risks.40
Second, even as a legal matter, the relevant standard is not welfare
neutrality of the overall merger as proposed. The issue is more
complicated. The proper standard is welfare maximization, subject to
constraints of practicality and deterrence. Firms would not be incentivized
to opt for the most efficient and procompetitive merger proposals if the
competitive-effects analysis were judged solely on the overall impact of the
merger proposal as a whole. Their incentives predictably would lead to
lower welfare and might be called “anti-deterrence.”41 Thus, agencies and
courts should analyze whether multiple aspects of the merger are
inextricably linked and reasonably necessary to achieve the welfare goals of
the transaction. If they are not inextricably linked, they should be evaluated
separately. This procedure is consistent with a standard of welfare
maximization, not welfare neutrality.
This policy analysis can be illustrated by the example of a firm that
carries out a series of acquisitions over time. For example, suppose that one
supermarket chain in Los Angeles first proposes to acquire one of the two
Los Angeles supermarket chains owned by a significant competitor.
Suppose that this acquisition of the one chain would be considered clearly
procompetitive and welfare enhancing and would be cleared by the agency.
Suppose, however, that the buyer subsequently proposes to acquire the
seller’s second chain three months later. Suppose that the agency concludes
that this second merger clearly would be anticompetitive and welfare
reducing. Thus, the agency would challenge this second merger. These
results are not controversial.
As a benchmark for comparison, consider the following alternative
timing. Suppose instead that the buyer had proposed to acquire both chains
simultaneously. Assume further that the agency concludes after its analysis
38. See Sims & McFalls, supra note 5, at 938.
39. For example, see Joseph G. Krauss et al., The Tunney Act: A House Still Standing,
ANTITRUST SOURCE (June 2007), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/
antitrust_source/Jun07_Krauss6_20f.authcheckdam.pdf. For a critical view, see John J.
Flynn & Darren Bush, The Misuse and Abuse of the Tunney Act: The Adverse Consequences
of the “Microsoft Fallacies, 34 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 749 (2003).
40. See supra Part II.
41. Anti-deterrence is discussed in more detail in Part III.
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that both acquisitions considered jointly (on an all-or-nothing basis) would
raise welfare but that the welfare enhancement actually comes solely from
the acquisition of the first chain. That is, the acquisition of the second
chain reduces welfare (as in the first example) by less than the acquisition
of the first chain raises welfare. If the two acquisitions were inextricably
linked in some way, it would make sense to analyze the acquisitions as a
single unit. But, in the hypothetical example, suppose that the agency
concludes that the welfare benefits from the first acquisition are not
inextricably linked to the second acquisition. That is, suppose that the
agency further concludes that, if the two acquisitions had been attempted
sequentially, the second acquisition would have been challenged as
anticompetitive, just as in the previous scenario.
In this hypothetical, the agency should not permit the acquisition of the
second chain.42 The merger-specific efficiencies are not inextricably linked
to the acquisition of the second chain. This merger (absent the divestiture)
could also be considered a violation of section 7. The acquisition of the
smaller chain has the effect of substantially lessening competition.43
These examples show that if competitive effects are evaluated solely on
the overall impact, it could incentivize merging firms to broaden their
procompetitive merger proposals to include anticompetitive elements. This
might involve expanding the set of assets acquired. It also might involve
including (or even adding) anticompetitive provisions. This is a harmful
incentive that predictably would lead to lower welfare. Thus, if merger law
is concerned at all with deterrence, it must condemn this conduct. This
implies that the legal standard is welfare maximization, not simply welfare
neutrality of the overall merger proposal. Only if the multiple elements of
the merger are inextricably linked, as explained in the Merger Guidelines,
should they be evaluated as unitary.44
This focus on welfare maximization does have two important limits.
This analysis does not give the agencies carte blanche to engage in subtle
restructuring of procompetitive mergers in order to gain small increases in
welfare. First, a small welfare enhancing divestiture may not be practical.
A small divestiture might not raise welfare while a large divestiture may
lead to litigation in a world with imperfect information. Second, as
discussed below, a policy of exacting tribute from mergers that are welfare
enhancing as proposed actually may reduce deterrence by lessening the
incentives of merging firms to forgo welfare-reducing proposals in favor of
welfare-enhancing ones. Thus, it would not be long-run optimal.45

42. Or, if the seller insisted on selling both chains, the agency should require the
divestiture of the second chain.
43. This analysis easily can be placed into the context of section 1. The acquisition of
the second chain’s assets (and the resulting incremental reduction in welfare) is not
reasonably necessary for the success of the merger as a whole.
44. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 30.
45. See supra Part IV.B.
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C. Merger Selection, Restructuring, and Deterrence Effects
The analysis of the short-run optimal policy assumes that the agency and
the merging firms take the structure of the proposed merger as fixed. The
merging firms respond to the agency’s settlement demand by settling,
litigating, or abandoning the transaction. However, in the real world, the
firms might voluntarily restructure the merger even before proposing it to
the agency. Restructuring can benefit the firms by altering the agency’s
demand.
Such restructuring incentives are straightforward to analyze when there is
perfect information and de minimis litigation and delay costs, and when the
agency demands the welfare-maximizing settlement for all welfarereducing mergers while clearing as proposed welfare-neutral and welfareenhancing mergers. Suppose that an acquiring firm is contemplating a
welfare-reducing merger proposal. Anticipating the agency’s settlement
demand, it would be in the interest of the firm voluntarily to restructure the
merger proposal to the welfare-neutral level. Although this structure would
reduce its profits relative to the original merger as proposed, it likely would
lead to higher profits than if the agency forced the firms to make the
welfare-maximizing divestiture. The same result could occur if the
acquiring firm has a choice to select one of several potential merger
partners.
Although the agency in this example is following a short-run policy
without regard to deterrence, its policy nonetheless has a deterrent effect.46
Deterrence is an important goal of merger enforcement. Agency settlement
policy must treat deterrence as a central goal.
III. IMPERFECT INFORMATION, LITIGATION COSTS, AND THE AGENCY’S
SHORT-RUN OPTIMAL SETTLEMENT COMMITMENT STRATEGY
Agency settlement behavior depends on whether the agency focuses
solely on the merger under consideration or whether it takes deterrence
effects into account. This part analyzes the optimal policy when deterrence
is not the focus. The analysis of this short-run optimal policy is complex
when the parties have imperfect information and significant litigation costs.
The predicted results resemble the outcomes discussed—and criticized—by
commentators.
A. Basic Analytics
The analysis can be explained most simply by distinguishing among
mergers that have different welfare impacts as proposed. Much of the
analysis in this section is based on the technical model contained in the
Appendix.
46. On closer analysis, however, the voluntary restructuring ironically is harmful to
welfare. As a result of this voluntary restructuring, the agency then loses the opportunity to
force the firm to settle for the welfare-maximizing structure.
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1. Welfare-Reducing Mergers
Consider a merger that is expected to be welfare reducing as proposed.
The agency would choose the settlement demand that optimally balances
the risks and rewards of being more or less aggressive. On the one hand,
the reward for being more aggressive is that welfare will be higher, if the
settlement demand is accepted. On the other hand, the risk is that the
merging firms are less likely to accept a tougher demand. And, if the firms
reject the demand, the agency may lose in court, in which case consumers
will suffer the welfare reduction from the merger as proposed.
For this reason, it may be optimal for the agency to propose a settlement
that nonetheless would lead to welfare harm, even if the agency litigation
costs are zero. The explanation for this striking result is the agency’s fear
of the court reaching a false-acquittal result and permitting the merger as
proposed. In deciding whether to accommodate a welfare-reducing
settlement, the agency would recognize that a false acquittal would lead to
even greater welfare harm than would an accommodative settlement.
This analysis also shows how a greater potential for judicial errors affects
settlements. The larger the probability of a false acquittal, the more likely
the agency would have the incentive to weaken its settlement demand.
Indeed, even if the likelihood of a false negative falls far short of 50
percent, the agency might still be so fearful that the firms would reject the
settlement and the agency would lose in court that it will accept a
significantly welfare-reducing settlement.47
In fact, a merger with larger welfare harm as proposed sometimes can
lead the agency to demand an even weaker welfare-reducing settlement.
This can occur if the likelihood of a false acquittal for the more harmful
merger proposal nonetheless remains significant. In particular, when the
expected harm from a merger as proposed is higher (that is, when the
decrease in the likelihood that the firms would win in court is more than
offset by a larger potential welfare harm from the more problematic
merger), then the agency has more to lose from going to court. This is a
very significant result because it suggests that firms may do better by
proposing more problematic mergers, what might be called “antideterrence.”
There are limits to this effect. One might expect that the likelihood of a
false acquittal would become very low for egregiously anticompetitive
mergers, leading to a lower expected welfare harm. But, while this might
be true in the extreme, the agency cannot simply assume that the probability
of a false negative approaches zero, even for substantially anticompetitive
transactions. The defense could win on a procedural technicality; the
47. The agency also would be more willing to be satisfied with a negative welfare
settlement when a welfare-neutral settlement demand would lead to a substantial reduction in
the likelihood that the firms would accept the settlement. In that situation, it might make
sense for the agency to settle for a smaller welfare reduction, rather than take on the
litigation risk of a false-acquittal outcome.
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agency’s lawyers may be outgunned in court by a well-financed and skillful
adversary; the agency’s key witness might blow up on the stand; or, perhaps
an inexperienced, careless, or ideologically blinded district court judge will
totally miss out on the merits.48
In contrast, there are two situations where an agency focused only on the
short-run clearly would find it optimal to insist on a welfare-enhancing
settlement. One situation is a case in which both the agency and the firms
perceive that the agency’s chances of winning in court are very high. In
that situation, the firms would likely be willing to agree to a welfareenhancing settlement and the agency would have the incentive to take the
(small) risk that the firms would choose to litigate. The other situation
involves an agency expectation that the risk-reward ratio is low, that is,
where the agency perceives that a more aggressive settlement demand
would not significantly reduce the firms’ willingness to settle. In that case,
the more aggressive settlement demand would have only a very small
downside risk. As a result, it would make sense for the agency to push the
envelope.
2. Welfare-Neutral and Welfare-Enhancing Mergers
Consider next a welfare-neutral merger proposal. Putting aside agency
litigation costs, it always would be short-run optimal for the agency to
demand a welfare-improving settlement rather than clear the merger as
proposed. The firms would almost surely accept a modest settlement. But,
even if there is some chance that a more aggressive demand would lead to
litigation and potential loss in court, the agency would lose nothing.
Consider next a merger that is expected to be welfare enhancing as
proposed. The agency nonetheless may demand a settlement that would
increase welfare, rather than permit the merger as proposed. The merger as
proposed does not maximize welfare, so there is room for a welfare
improvement by a more aggressive stance.49 As long as the firms have
some fear of losing in court or some litigation or delay costs, they would
have the incentive to make some concessions. This situation illustrates a
bargaining advantage that the agency has in settlement negotiations.
The agency’s short-run optimal settlement demand would be simple if it
knew the firms’ profit function and litigation and delay costs. The agency
could demand the maximum settlement offer that the firm would accept.
However, with imperfect information, demanding a more aggressive
48. For example, in FTC v. Whole Foods Market Inc., the judge apparently overlooked
statements by the CEO that one effect of the merger would be to eliminate the possibility of
future price wars. See FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007),
rev’d, 548 F.3d 1028, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 2008). In Lundbeck, the judge made an inexplicable
market definition error. See FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., 2010-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 77,160 (D.
Minn. 2010), aff’d, 650 F.3d 1236 (8th Cir. 2011).
49. This assumes, of course, that the efficiencies would not be lost. Where the
efficiencies are inextricably linked to the divested assets, consumer welfare benefits could be
lost.
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settlement is a risky and somewhat ironic agency strategy. On the one
hand, if the firms accept the settlement, welfare will improve. On the other
hand, if the firms reject the settlement and the agency wins in court (as a
result of a false acquittal), welfare will be lower than if the merger were
cleared as proposed. Thus, if the merging firms reject the settlement
demand, the agency actually may have the short-run incentive to abandon
the litigation.50
For this reason, when the agency decides to demand a settlement for a
welfare-enhancing merger as proposed, it must do so judiciously. First, the
agency should only take this aggressive approach when the merger as
proposed is not substantially better than welfare neutral. In that situation,
the agency has less to lose if the firms reject the settlement and the agency
wins in court. Second, the agency should reserve such an aggressive
strategy for situations where the firms’ litigation and delay costs appear
high. In that way, the probability is lower that the settlement will be
rejected. Third, the agency should not be greedy. It should not demand
such a large divestiture that it becomes unlikely that the firms will accept
the settlement.
There are several economic reasons why such an aggressive policy might
not be short-run optimal for the agency, even if the agency ignores
deterrence effects. First, the agency may be less intent on extracting small
settlements because such settlements may not actually increase welfare.
For example, a divestiture that does not include an entire business may be
too small to create a viable business entity.51 Second, the agencies
conceivably may feel that extracting such tribute is irresponsible behavior
that involves the abuse of governmental power. Or, perhaps staff morale
would be reduced by litigating such cases. Third, the agencies may fear
that the firms will litigate out of anger, despite the cost of doing so.52
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, extracting tribute is not long-run
optimal. It can be an impediment to effective deterrence, as discussed
below in Part IV.

50. One possible option would be for the agency to assign its less talented litigators to
the case as a way to reduce its likelihood of winning in court. Of course, given the
importance of the agency maintaining its commitments in order to incentivize future firms to
accept such settlements, abandoning the suit or throwing the game would not be a wise move
in the long term.
51. See FTC, BUREAU OF COMPETITION, A STUDY OF THE COMMISSION’S DIVESTITURE
PROCESS 4 (1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/08/divestiture.pdf.
52. Although this is an explanation grounded in practical reality and behavioral
economics, rather than purely rational decision making, it is common for bargaining to go
awry when one side appears unreasonable. FREUND, supra note 21, at 80. This is a common
result in the Ultimatum Game. See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Cooperation and
Punishment in Public Goods Experiments, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 980, 984–93 (2000); Richard
H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game, 2 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 195, 196–203
(1988).
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B. The Role of Judicial Error
A higher likelihood of judicial errors will impact the agency’s optimal
settlement demand. If the likelihood of false acquittals is higher, the
agency must be more accommodating in its settlement demands in welfarereducing mergers. This is an unsurprising result. Perhaps more
surprisingly, if the likelihood of false convictions is higher, the agency also
should be less aggressive in its settlement demands in welfare-enhancing
mergers. This is an implication of the result that welfare is higher when the
agency loses a welfare-enhancing litigated case than when it wins.
C. Deterrence Impacts
As discussed earlier in the case of perfect information, there are
deterrence effects even if the agency does not design its policies with
deterrence in mind. The deterrence effects can involve the selection of a
merger partner or the proposed structure of the merger. These results also
occur when there is imperfect information and litigation costs. These
deterrence effects can be counterintuitive.
1. Beneficial Deterrence
Consider a welfare-reducing merger proposal. It might be in the
acquiring firm’s interest to choose a less problematic merger partner or
restructure the terms of the merger in a more accommodative way before
being confronted by the agency.53 Even if the agency does not demand a
strict welfare-enhancing proposal, a somewhat less harmful structure could
increase the likelihood of a false acquittal. This higher probability of a false
acquittal would increase the incentives of the firm to reject an aggressive
settlement demand and raise agency concerns about losing in court. Both
effects would serve to deter the agency from making a more aggressive
settlement demand. As a result, the firms may end up with higher profits.
This deterrence is beneficial in the sense that the proposed structure is less
welfare reducing.54
2. Anti-deterrence
With imperfect information and litigation costs, the result could reduce
deterrence or create “anti-deterrence.” That is, the firms may find it more
profitable to propose a more problematic merger or structure their merger in
53. Restructuring might be done as part of a prepackaged voluntary divestiture or
through other agreements made at the time of the initial HSR filing. Or, it might be
formulated during the investigation process. As long as a court will evaluate the impact of a
restructured transaction, not the original structure, this type of restructuring would place the
firms in a better position to resist aggressive settlement demands by the agency.
54. Of course, the existence of deterrence effects does not mean that there is optimal
deterrence. Optimal deterrence would require additional information about the distribution
of potential mergers. Analyzing this issue is beyond the scope of this Article. The required
data also would be difficult to collect.
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a more welfare-reducing way in an attempt to frighten the agency into
accepting a weaker settlement.
Normally, a larger welfare-reducing merger proposal would decrease
the likelihood of a false acquittal and would thereby embolden the agency
to demand an even stronger settlement. But, where there is a significant
likelihood of a false acquittal that is not highly affected by the merger
structure, the opposite result can occur. The fear of a larger welfare
reduction, in the event that the settlement is rejected and the court falsely
acquits, will serve to “up the ante” for the agency and may lead it to
propose a weaker settlement. As a result, the profits of the merging firms
may rise.55
Merging firms would never say publicly that they are taking a more
aggressive approach to create an in terrorem effect on the agencies. But
this type of conduct sometimes appears to occur. More importantly, this
result suggests the importance of the agency designing a long-run optimal
merger settlement policy that takes deterrence effects into account.
IV. LONG-RUN OPTIMAL POLICIES FOR EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE
Deterrence of anticompetitive conduct is an important goal of antitrust
law and merger enforcement. Courts and commentators often phrase this
issue in terms of minimizing the frequency and cost of “false positives” and
“false negatives.” These terms are sometimes treated as if they solely
involve erroneous convictions and acquittals made by courts, given the
legal standard. But, the terms also implicate deterrence in the setting of
legal standards.56 Instead, a better interpretation of the term “false
positives” would include “over-deterrence.”
The previous analysis of the short-run optimal policy assumed that the
agency determined its settlement demand for each merger on its own,
without reference to the impact of its decisions on future mergers. Those
decisions nonetheless would have beneficial or adverse deterrence effects.
A long-term optimal strategy would attempt to deter anticompetitive
mergers while encouraging procompetitive ones, as well as interdicting

55. For example, suppose that the court may erroneously define the market so broadly
that the combined market share of the merging firms will be in the safe harbor with or
without a divestiture. The Merger Guidelines contain a provision that if the HHI is
sufficiently low, the merger normally will be cleared without further analysis, a provision
that is commonly referred to as a “safe harbor.” See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 701, 721 n.76
(2010).
56. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 763 (1984)
(“[D]eter or penalize perfectly legitimate conduct.”); see also Monsanto Elec. Indus. Co. v
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986) (“[C]hill the very conduct the antitrust laws
are designed to protect.”). Indeed, if the sole goal in setting a legal standard were to
minimize errors, without any regard to deterrence effects, one optimal standard would be per
se illegality backed up by huge sanctions. With that standard, no one would ever violate the
law, so there would be no trials and, therefore, no erroneous convictions or acquittals.
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anticompetitive merger proposals and permitting procompetitive ones to
proceed.
Formulating a settlement policy to achieve optimal deterrence is not a
trivial undertaking when the parties have imperfect information and
litigation costs.57 However, further analysis can describe some of the key
principles of such a policy. The analysis also suggests several useful rules
of thumb.
A. Tailoring Settlement Demands To Increase Deterrence
Deterrence functions by impacting the incentives of the merging firms.
The general way to achieve deterrence is to formulate a policy that leads
firms to have higher expected returns from welfare-enhancing merger
proposals than for welfare-reducing proposals. The agencies have two
basic policy instruments: issuing complaints and demanding settlements.58
Issuing complaints is a costly approach, and it is imperfect in light of the
judicial false-acquittal problem.
The agencies can use settlement demands to improve deterrence.59 This
would involve demanding aggressive settlements for welfare-reducing
merger proposals while clearing welfare-enhancing mergers. This policy
would increase the benefits at the margin to the firms making more
procompetitive merger proposals. Thus, the firms’ incentives to propose or
restructure welfare-reducing mergers would be increased.
This result follows from the basic economics of optimal deterrence.
Suppose that the incidence of false convictions and false acquittals means
that the likelihood of being convicted and penalized does not increase very
much when an individual actually violates the legal standard, compared to
57. Building a formal optimal control model to derive the optimal long-run settlement
policy for a distribution of merger proposals and firm restructuring decisions in response to
the policy is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, this Article will discuss several rules
of thumb for approaching optimality. There is economic literature involving formal models
of merger enforcement policy for optimal deterrence. For example, the recent article by
Nocke and Whinston concludes that for all but the smallest acquirer, the agency only should
approve mergers that increase welfare surplus by an amount that exceeds a strictly positive
minimal acceptable level. See Volker Nocke & Michael. D. Whinston, Merger Policy with
Merger Choice, (Northwestern Univ., Searle Ctr. Legal & Regulatory Studies, Working
Paper, 2010), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/papers/Nocke
Whinston_MergerChoic.pdf. In contrast, their earlier article concludes that dynamic
optimality is achieved if the agency follows a simple myopic merger policy of approving all
mergers that increase consumer welfare. See Volker Nocke & Michael. D. Whinston,
Dynamic Merger Review (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14526,
2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1312621. These
models do not include either settlements or litigation risk.
58. The agency could achieve more deterrence if it had the ability to directly levy high
fees on welfare-reducing mergers. However, the only way it can “tax” is to issue complaints
or demand settlements.
59. For the purposes of this Article, I assume that the optimal strategy is to make
nonnegotiable settlement demands. There are certain benefits to adopting a negotiation
strategy instead, as noted elsewhere. Subsequent work can examine this assumption in more
detail.
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when the individual actually satisfies the standard. In this scenario, the
incentives to satisfy the standard are reduced, relative to the case in which
there are no errors.60 The analysis is somewhat more complicated when the
individual can control behavior at the margin with (marginally) more or less
“aggressive” behavior (i.e., choosing whether or not to step closer to or just
over the line separating legal from illegal behavior). If the choice of
behavior at the margin does not have much effect on the probability and
likelihood of being detected and convicted or on the resulting expected
sanction, there is less incentive to stay within the legal line, which would
lead to under-deterrence.61
The likelihood of false acquittals in this analysis complicates the optimal
policy because it weakens the relationship between the behavior and the
likelihood of being penalized. However, this weakening effect can be
mitigated by increasing penalties. For example, this is one role of treble
damages in antitrust.62
This deterrence analysis can also be applied to settlements. While the
exact shape of the optimal settlement and enforcement policy is impossible
to describe algebraically, and would depend on the underlying distribution
of merger proposals and effects, this analysis suggests three simple rules of
thumb to improve deterrence. By following these three rules, the agencies
would give merging firms an increased incentive to propose welfareenhancing mergers and restructure welfare-reducing mergers voluntarily.
60. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 1477, 1484 (1999). For a simple technical example, see Henrik Lando, Does Wrongful
Conviction Lower Deterrence?, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 327, 329–30 (2006). Lando’s example
assumes that the probability of a false acquittal is Pa, the probability of a false conviction is
Pc and the sanction is a fine of F. In that case, the expected sanction when the individual
violates the rule is (1-Pa)F, while the expected sanction when the individual satisfies the rule
is PcF. The incentive to satisfy the rule depends on the difference in expected sanctions (1Pa-Pc)F. This expression shows that false convictions as well as false acquittals reduce the
incentives to comply with the rule. The intuition of this reasoning can be illustrated with an
extreme example. Suppose that the police stop and ticket for speeding randomly, rather than
according to the driver’s speed. In this scenario, there is no incentive to slow down because
Pa=Pc=1/2. A driver might as well exceed the speed limit and reach the destination more
quickly. Lando also discusses the certain limitations to this under-deterrence result. See
generally Warren F. Schwartz, Legal Error, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
1029–1040 (Boudewijn Bouchaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
61. See generally John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on
Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984). In contrast, even if the
likelihood of detection and conviction (and so the expected sanction) is low, a large increase
in the likelihood of detection and conviction for marginally more aggressive behavior around
the legal line will tend to lead to substantial deterrence, perhaps even over-deterrence.
62. Treble damages are often justified on the grounds that the illegal conduct (e.g.,
covert price fixing conspiracies) is often undetected. However, the same analysis would
apply to any reason why illegal behavior would not be penalized, including erroneous
acquittals. In fact, this analysis implies the ironic result that punitive damages make more
sense for the “difficult” cases, where errors are more likely, in contrast to “egregious” cases
that are easy to detect and lead to certain conviction. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell,
Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 891 (1998); Steven C.
Salop & Lawrence White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J.
1001, 1031 (1986).
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Anti-deterrence effects also would be greatly reduced. The three rules of
thumb can be summarized as follows:
One, the agencies should commit to clear all mergers that are welfare
enhancing as proposed, even if it would be possible to extract a beneficial
settlement.
Two, the agencies should commit never to accept welfare-reducing
settlements, even if there is risk of a false acquittal.
Three, the agencies should commit to always demand settlements for
welfare-reducing merger proposals that lead to significant welfare
increases, not simply welfare neutrality.
These rules of thumb follow directly from the basic deterrence analysis.
By forgoing tribute settlements for welfare-enhancing proposals, while
demanding strong settlements (i.e., settlements that go beyond the welfareneutral outcome) for welfare-reducing proposals, the policy increases the
disincentive for the firms to make merger-reducing proposals. This
additional wedge is needed because of the adverse effects on deterrence of
false acquittals by the courts. This policy notably rejects the view that the
agency should only attempt to achieve welfare neutrality. While this policy
might be controversial as a political matter, it does serve the fundamental
deterrence goals of antitrust.63 Demanding only welfare-neutral settlements
would lead to under-deterrence. At the same time, the agency should not
demand “tribute” settlements for mergers that are welfare enhancing as
proposed, even if the merging firms would accept such settlements because
of litigation costs and delay risks.64
Determining the exact magnitude of the required welfare increase for
settlements of welfare-reducing merger proposals requires further analysis,
though it is clear that welfare neutrality is too accommodative a standard. It
is also clear that more harmful merger proposals demand more beneficial
settlements. This standard is necessary to maintain the incentives of
potential merging firms to select less harmful merger proposals or
voluntarily restructure their proposals in beneficial ways. However,
without knowing more about the distribution of mergers and their effects on
welfare, profits, and other relevant factors, it is difficult to draw more
specific conclusions.
B. Maintaining Discipline
Following these rules of thumb for optimal deterrence strategy requires
discipline, that is, a commitment not to deviate from these settlement
policies. Discipline is needed because deviation from the long-run optimal
decision and reversion to the short-run optimal settlement demand would be
in the agency’s short-run interest. For example, after a merger is proposed,
if the agency myopically ignores the inevitable effects on deterrence, the
63. An understanding of the deterrence benefits also might make the policy less
politically controversial.
64. Subject to the caveats discussed in Part II.B and below.
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agency might have the incentive to settle for a weaker, welfare reducing
settlement for a harmful merger that involves a significant risk of a false
acquittal. It also might have the incentive to use its bargaining power to
extract a small divestiture for a welfare-enhancing merger.
This guidance can be stated as a rule of thumb. The optimal deterrence
strategy does not permit the agency to be “gun shy” about going to court.
This is the case even if the short-run welfare effects from settling would
seem favorable, once a litigation discount is subtracted to account for the
litigation risks. On the other side, the agency also must resist the
opportunistic incentive to collect settlement “scalps” for welfare-enhancing
mergers, even if the parties are willing to cave.
There are several impediments to maintaining such a disciplined policy.
With respect to welfare-reducing mergers, agencies do not like to lose in
court, as discussed already. However, there are good reasons why agencies
should be less defensive about losses in court and should not be “gun shy”
about bringing cases instead of agreeing to welfare-reducing settlements.
First, any claim that losses in court imply agency overreaching or bad
judgment certainly should be discounted. It is well established in the law
and economics literature on equilibrium case selection bias that the win-loss
record mainly reflects differences in the litigants’ costs and benefits of
going to trial. 65 In the simplest situation where the stakes are symmetric,
only the hardest cases reach adjudication, and the equilibrium win-loss rate
is 50/50.66 Deviations from 50/50 reflect asymmetries in the stakes or
unanticipated changes in one side’s (here, more likely the agency’s)
litigation strategy.
Agencies also might fear that losses in court would adversely affect
merger law.67 Merger cases are very fact based, which generally should
lead to narrow (if any) legal precedents.68 But, more generally, if losses in
court are harmful, wins are beneficial, and it is not clear why losses would
have larger long-term effects than wins.69 Moreover, these effects may be
exacerbated today precisely because so few cases are litigated. If the
agencies were to bring more cases, each decision would carry less weight

65. See Priest & Klein, supra note 2, at 5.
66. Id. at 17–20; Salop & White, supra note 62, at 1063.
67. At the same time, it is the function of courts to affect the law. Settlements deal the
courts out of the process. See Pitofsky, supra note 4.
68. The possible exception is the attempt by either side to substitute presumptions for
facts. Reliance on presumptions can be a signal of a weak factual case. But arguing for
presumptions also can be an explicit agency strategy to create stronger law for greater future
deterrence.
69. Whole Foods provides an interesting example of the way in which judicial opinions
can be two-edged swords. The district court inexplicably ignored the CEO’s statements
about the merger eliminating the fear of price wars. See FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 502
F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007). But, the D.C. Circuit panel then held that the FTC has a
reduced burden of proof for obtaining a preliminary injunction. See FTC v. Whole Foods
Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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and the random effects of different courts—especially outlier courts—might
tend to wash out.
The overreaching claim also relies on the false assumption that the
factual conclusions of the court are generally superior to the conclusions of
the agency in deciding to bring the case. This assumption seems unlikely to
be true.70 A typical judge in the District Court for the District of Columbia
might hear one merger case every five years, and few obtained antitrust
experience in the private bar. In contrast, agency staffs are comprised of
lawyers and economists trained in competition analysis. They develop
extensive experience by working full-time on proposed mergers. They
work in teams and argue among themselves, which also should serve to
reduce the error rate.
Some might even argue that as a doctrinal matter, courts reach the true
conclusion of whether the merger is anticompetitive as a matter of
definition. However, this argument is fundamentally flawed. It is a tenet of
the economic analysis of law that courts face inherently imperfect
information.71 As emphasized in Supreme Court opinions, generalist courts
generate false acquittals (i.e., false negatives) and false convictions (i.e.,
false positives).72 One cannot build a logical jurisprudence on the concern
with false positives/false negatives while simultaneously believing that
factual disagreements between the agency and the court involve the court
necessarily being right and the agency necessarily being wrong.
Discipline also entails the agency forgoing use of its bargaining power to
extract tribute settlements for welfare-enhancing mergers.
Those
settlements can be attractive to the agency. If well designed, such
settlements can raise welfare. As discussed above, they also serve the goal
of deterrence when they target situations where the merging parties propose
an overly broad acquisition that is not inextricably linked to the overall
welfare benefits of the merger, or where the parties append anticompetitive
provisions.73
Unfortunately, such settlements are potentially subject to overuse or even
abuse. They may interfere with deterrence by reducing at the margin the
incentives to propose welfare-enhancing mergers. Therefore, it is important
that such settlements be reined in. One way to achieve this goal is by
limiting such settlements solely to situations where the merging parties
propose an overly broad acquisition (with elements clearly not inextricably
linked to increasing welfare) or append anticompetitive provisions to an
otherwise beneficial merger.

70. As noted earlier, I assume that the agencies generally are more skilled than the
courts.
71. See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking,
3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 278 (1974); see also C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop,
Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41, 43 (1999).
72. See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 414 (2004).
73. See supra Part I.B.
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The latter condition (“append anticompetitive provisions”) represents
both a bright line and involves an indefensible addition to the merger
agreement. Thus, it is easy to justify and enforce, without a significant
potential for reducing deterrence. In contrast, the former condition (“overly
broad acquisition”) is not as bright a line and so it could be subject to
misuse. Thus, its usage must be carefully monitored. This also
demonstrates the benefits of the “just say no” bright-line rule as a policy to
maintain effective discipline.
C. Maintaining Discipline with the “Just Say No” Enforcement Policy
Discipline can also be maintained by making clear commitments to these
principles and rules of thumb.
Commitments might be made in
pronouncements like the Merger Guidelines. However, these do not
achieve airtight commitments because the Merger Guidelines do not
represent unbreakable vows. It also can be difficult for outsiders to detect
deviations from the Guidelines because the analysis is so fact based. In the
end, the agencies must rely on the establishment of a reputation.
One path to an effective reputation is to adopt a simple and
straightforward policy. Simplicity aids transparency, which speeds the
establishment of the agency reputation. It also deters backsliding because
deviation from a simple policy can be easily and rapidly detected.74 Thus,
even if a more complex policy might have certain advantages, sacrificing
those advantages for simplicity can be a useful trade off.
This approach can be applied to merger enforcement policy. In the
analysis of short-run incentives, we noted that it was not optimal for the
agency to commit to a no-settlement policy. In contrast, once deterrence
concerns and the benefits of transparency are taken into account, there can
be benefits from a no-settlement commitment. The policy would function
as follows. On the one hand, if the merger is welfare enhancing or welfare
neutral, the agency would clear the merger as proposed. On the other hand,
if the merger is welfare reducing, the agency would “just say no” and file a
complaint. It would not negotiate or demand a fix. Applying the analogy
of just “calling balls and strikes,” a baseball umpire never negotiates.
Commitment to a “just say no” policy would achieve the greatest
deterrence. It also would address and reduce the concerns of Frankel,75
Sims and McFalls,76 and Melamed.77 The policy would prevent the agency
from exacting tribute settlements on welfare-enhancing proposed mergers,
as desired by Sims and McFalls.78 The “just say no” feature of the policy

74. One of the benefits of the classic tit-for-tat strategy in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma
game is its transparency. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 51–54
(1984).
75. See Frankel, supra note 8.
76. See Sims & McFalls, supra note 5.
77. See Melamed, supra note 1.
78. See Sims & McFalls, supra note 5.
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would eliminate the current regulatory approach, as desired by Melamed.79
If the agency were forced to “put up or shut up,” agency overreaching
would be deterred, and merging firms also would have to “put up or shut
up.” This would give the firms the incentive to restructure transactions
unilaterally, as desired by Frankel.80
This more aggressive approach might lead to more cases being litigated
in the short run while the expectations of the merging parties are
adjusting.81 Litigation costs would increase, but with large offsetting
benefits. An increase in litigation would also reduce the seeming
importance of each individual litigated case. As noted already, in today’s
environment, in which merger litigation is a rare event, the outcome of each
case is overinterpreted as a major signal of enforcement policy and legal
doctrine. If more cases were litigated, an outlier court would have less
effect. With more cases, the law of large numbers would begin to come
into play and establish real trends, if any. It is also possible that as courts
gain more experience, they might be more inclined to decide each case on
the basis of its particular facts, rather than simply creating legal
presumptions. Or, there might be dueling presumptions by different courts
that would lead to the law advancing.
D. Providing a Role for Balance
This is not to say that there are no benefits to settlements, even
occasional settlements that lead to welfare-reducing outcomes. The concern
is whether agency discipline can be maintained without a just-say-no policy
commitment. The overarching concern is that the focus on settlements can
swallow up the enforcement process in highly counterproductive ways. A
focus on settlement implicitly or explicitly encourages agency staff to focus
on the remedy and potential risks in court, rather than on the competitive
impact of the merger. One might frame the point as follows: the first
question that the staff should ask is whether the merger as proposed is
welfare reducing, not what divestitures might improve the outcome. The
just-say-no policy is a way to change the focus.
Settlements nonetheless can retain a residual policy role even if “just say
no” becomes the norm. Settlements—even welfare-reducing settlements—

79. See Melamed, supra note 1.
80. See Frankel, supra note 8.
81. Moving to the “just say no” policy could raise a practical concern that the agency
may not have sufficient capacity to litigate substantially more merger cases. In my view,
this concern is likely a red herring for several reasons. First, any such capacity limitations
would be transitory. If the agency decided to litigate more cases, it could recruit and train
additional litigators. Well-qualified attorneys would flock to the agency for the opportunity
to litigate merger cases. Second, in the longer run, litigation frequency would reequilibrate
at a lower level. Once the agency reputation is established, merging firms would propose
fewer anticompetitive mergers and would restructure others in advance in order to avoid
litigation. To make a simple analogy, a policy of refusing to negotiate with terrorists who
take hostages deters hostage taking.
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can be used to establish an agency foothold in an area.82 One recent
example (albeit in a litigated case) is the FTC’s order in the alreadyconsummated Evanston Northwestern/ENH merger.83 This case might be
viewed as a classic pyrrhic victory.84 The order did not entail a divestiture
but rather consisted of a likely ineffective order mandating that two
divisions of a single firm begin to compete. However, the policy benefit of
the case was to show how such a merger could raise prices, an important
finding in light of the string of previous agency losses in hospital merger
cases. At the same time, a settlement like this is easy to distinguish from
backsliding to a short-run strategy.
E. Encouraging Self-Identification, Disclosure, and Voluntary Remediation
Deterrence also could be increased by an “advance self-fix” policy to
encourage self-identification and early disclosure of competitive problems
and voluntary divestiture proposals by the merging parties.
Notwithstanding the general bargaining advantages gained by making
nonnegotiable settlement demands, there can be benefits from ceding the
role to the merging firms in this particular limited way.
Current practice requires the agency to identify the competitive problems
rather than encouraging voluntary disclosure by the parties. The merging
parties can simply wait and see if the agency detects the problem. If and
when a problem is detected, the parties then can propose a divestiture and
make a binding agreement with the divestiture buyer. This process reduces
deterrence. In addition, under cases like Arch Coal, the parties can use a
voluntary divestiture agreement as the competitive benchmark in the event
that the agency rejects the divestiture and litigates the case in court.85 This
voluntary divestiture might be made even after the complaint has been filed.
This procedural stance essentially eliminates the ability of the agency to
make nonnegotiable settlement demands, which in turn reduces the
bargaining power of the agency. Thus, this procedure also reduces
deterrence.

82. See Pitofsky, supra note 4.
83. In re Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., No. 9315, 2007 WL 4358355 (F.T.C. Nov. 9,
2007).
84. See generally Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories?, 12 J.L.
& ECON. 43 (1969).
85. In Arch Coal, the court concluded that Arch’s sale of one mine (Buckskin) to a
divestiture buyer (Kiewit) “would be considered as part of the challenged transactions” along
with Arch’s acquisition in evaluating “the probable effect of those transactions on
competition.” FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 114–15 n.2 (D.D.C. 2004).
Other courts have also treated the remedy as part of the transaction to be evaluated, although
there is still an open issue about which side has the burden of proof on remedy. Other recent
cases that raised this issue include United States v. Dairy Farmers of America, 426 F.3d 850
(6th Cir. 2005), and FTC v. CCC Holdings, 605 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2009); see also
Darren S. Tucker, The Elephant in the Room: Litigating the Fix After Arch Coal and Dairy
Farmers, ANTITRUST SOURCE (Jan. 2006), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publishing/antitrust_source/Jan06_FullSource1_27.authcheckdam.pdf.
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An alternative approach would entitle the merging firms to have the
voluntary divestiture treated as part of the merger transaction for the
purpose of competitive-effects analysis, but only if the divestiture
agreement is made well before the complaint is issued. The required timing
could be either as part of the initial HSR filing, during Phase 1 of the HSR
process, or before second request compliance is certified. This timing shift
would incentivize the merging parties to identify, disclose, and cure the
competitive problem in advance. It thus would increase deterrence. One
might refer to this as a credible “advance self-fix” policy, in contrast to the
current misnamed “fix-it-first” policy.86 This advance self-fix policy
requires adjustment of the current Arch Coal approach of allowing afterthe-fact voluntary divestiture agreements to be made part of the transaction
for purposes of evaluating competitive effects.
CONCLUSION
This Article has analyzed agency merger settlement demands under two
alternative policy assumptions: a short-run optimal policy that focuses only
on the merger under investigation without regard to future deterrence versus
a superior long-run optimal policy that takes deterrence benefits into
account. The criticisms of agency decisions suggest a current agency
approach something along the lines of the short-run policy. The principles
and rules of thumb for long-run deterrence developed here would involve a
notable shift in policy.
This Article also suggests further analysis. Much of the analysis in this
Article has assumed that the agencies can and do make nonnegotiable
settlement demands, backed by a commitment to litigate if the demands are
not accepted by the merging firms. This is not the typical agency
bargaining dynamic today. While certain agency bargaining advantages
flow from such a committed strategy, we have also noted certain
shortcomings of this strategy.
Negotiations can reveal important
information that can lead to higher welfare.87 It is possible that these
informational benefits may mitigate or trump the benefits to the agency
committing to a single nonnegotiable offer. Therefore, further analysis of
alternative negotiation strategies would be a useful extension.
This Article also suggests that deterrence may be compromised by
permitting the merging parties to make last-minute divestiture agreements

86. This advance self-fix proposal is thus very different from the agency “fix it first”
policy in that fix-it-first remedies can be proposed at the end of the HSR process but before a
complaint is filed. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER
REMEDIES 22 (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/272350.pdf.
87. This Article implicitly assumes that the agency does not make its settlement demand
until all the relevant information has been revealed. However, to the extent that both sides
became more (rather than less) open during settlement negotiations, such openness could
lead to benefits from a negotiation strategy rather than a commitment strategy. Discovery
during the pretrial phase of litigation could also disclose additional information that might
lead to productive settlement discussions. These issues are worthy of additional study.
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that are treated by the court as part of the merger agreement for the purpose
of evaluating competitive effects. At the same time, consistent with the
suggested approach in this Article, it has become more common for merger
agreements to commit the acquiring firm to certain potential divestitures. It
would be useful to evaluate these merger agreements in more detail and
analyze the effects of such agreements in settlement negotiations and their
impact on deterrence.
Finally, the analysis of the long-run optimal policy has focused on
several policy rules of thumb, rather than examining alternative policies in
the context of a formal economic model. While it is unlikely that a single
model would capture all the complexity involved in merger-settlement
policy, developing formal models no doubt would push our understanding
forward. Therefore, additional formal modeling efforts also would be
useful.
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APPENDIX: FORMAL MODEL OF SHORT-RUN
OPTIMAL SETTLEMENT DEMANDS
To better expose the logic of the analysis, it is useful to formulate a
technical model of agency behavior. Embedding the analysis in a technical
model also permits the derivation of certain key properties of the short-run
optimal settlement strategy.
A merger can be characterized as having a set of structural and market
characteristics that determine the expected impact of the merger on the net
present value (NPV) of economic welfare (whether consumer welfare or
aggregate welfare) and profits of the merging parties.
One key
characteristic is the set of assets comprising the transaction. Other
characteristics include all the usual market structure factors commonly
investigated in merger analysis—market shares and concentration; ease of
entry; diversion ratios; margins; GUPPIs; elasticity of demand; expansion
and repositioning; buyer power, synergies, factors that facilitate or
complicate coordination, etc.88
A merger proposal can be characterized by its set of structural and
behavioral characteristics. For simplicity, we assume that there is a single
scalar characteristic y, and the specific merger is characterized by y=ŷ and
NPVs of incremental expected welfare and profits, denoted by W(y) and
П(y), respectively. We assume that all three participants (the agency, the
firms, and the court) face imperfect information about welfare and that the
agency has unbiased estimates of expected welfare. Incremental welfare
and profits can be affected by a settlement (e.g., a divestiture or other
changes that leads to a new structure S < ŷ). We focus on divestitures and
other remedies that raise welfare but reduce profits.
The left panel, Figure 1A, illustrates a merger as proposed with structure
ŷ and negative expected incremental welfare W(ŷ). The right panel, Figure
1B, shows the incremental profits П(ŷ). Figure 1 illustrates the relationship
between incremental welfare and profits for various alternative settlement
structures. If the agency demands a settlement S such that П(S)<0, then the
firm would abandon the transaction rather than accept the settlement. If the
proposed merger is abandoned or enjoined, which we formalize as y=0,
then the incremental welfare and profit would equal zero.

88. Certain merger characteristics affect welfare and profits in the same direction. For
example, synergies increase both the incremental profitability and welfare. However, other
factors affect welfare and profits in opposite directions. For example, high barriers to entry
would likely lead to higher profits and lower welfare, other variables held constant. Some
factors might move welfare and profits in the same direction in one region but in opposite
directions in other regions.

2013] MERGER SETTLEMENT AND ENFORCEMENT POLICY

2679

Figure 1

We focus on settlements between M and ŷ that achieve higher welfare,
W(S)>W(ŷ), but lower profits, П(S)<П(ŷ). As illustrated in Figure 1A,
there is a settlement structure that leads to welfare neutrality, which we
denote as S=N. There is another settlement, S=M, that maximizes
welfare.89
We assume that a court will reject a proposed merger if and only if it
concludes that the expectation is that the merger will be welfare reducing,
relative to the no-merger alternative. We assume that the court is less
informed and less expert than the agency, so there is some probability that it
will reach an erroneous outcome. We denote with p(y) the probability that
the court permits a merger with structure y. We assume that the court is
less likely to falsely acquit if the welfare harms are larger, that is, p’(y)<0.
For simplicity, we assume that the agency and the merging parties agree
about the probability of the outcome in court.
In order to estimate the likelihood that its settlement demand would be
accepted by the merging firms, the agency forms expectations about the
firms’ incremental profitability of the merger and their litigation and delay
costs, including delay risks. This might be formalized as follows: the firms
would accept a settlement demand S that would lead to profits П(S) that
exceed
the
firm’s
expected
profits
from
litigating,
or
(1) П(S) > (1 – γ)[p(ŷ)П(ŷ) – CF]
where CF is the merging firms’ out-of-pocket litigation cost, γ is the
probability that the delay will cause the transaction to be terminated by the
parties, and p(ŷ) is the probability that the firm wins in court. Equation (1)
89. If the settlement involves a divestiture that moves the structure of the merger below
M, both incremental welfare and incremental profits fall, so such settlements would never be
proposed.
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assumes for simplicity that the litigation costs are only borne if the deal is
not terminated, though it is likely that in reality there would be some
litigation costs before the deal is terminated.
If the agency had perfect information about equation (1), it could tailor
the maximum settlement demand that the merging firms would accept.90
However, we assume that the agency generally has imperfect information
about the firms’ profitability.91 For purposes of the economic model, we
assume that the agency forms an estimate a(S) that the firm will accept a
settlement demand S. We assume that a weaker settlement offer is more
likely to be accepted by the parties (i.e., a’(S)>0).
We assume that the agency makes a nonnegotiable, “take it or leave it”
settlement demand, backed up by a commitment to litigate if its demand is
rejected by the firms. The settlement demand S can range at one end from
de minimis demand (S~ŷ) that barely (if at all) affects the welfare impact,
up to a large change (S=M) that would lead to welfare being maximized.
An agency’s absolute decision to litigate is equivalent to making a
settlement demand so large that the merging firms would surely choose to
reject.
The agency chooses the settlement demand S* to maximize expected
welfare EW, that is,
(2)

Max EW = a(S)W(S) + (1 – a(S))(1 – γ)[p(ŷ)W(ŷ) – C]
S

where W(S) is the agency’s estimate of the expected welfare outcome if the
settlement is accepted, W(ŷ) is the agency’s estimate of expected welfare if
the settlement is rejected and the agency loses in court, a(S) is the agency’s
estimate of the likelihood that the settlement is rejected by the merging
parties, p(ŷ) is the probability that the agency loses in court, γ is the
probability that the deal is terminated voluntarily as the result of the agency
complaint, and C is the agency’s opportunity cost of litigation.92
This model assumes that the agency commits to litigating if its settlement
demand is rejected. The agency does not bluff. While equation (2)
describes the short-run optimal policy that takes the structure of the merger

90. This Article does not focus on the use of settlement demands to reveal asymmetric
information. Instead, it simply focuses on the parties that have differential beliefs as a result
of limited information on both sides. It also does not analyze the structure of the imperfect
information, at least initially. Instead, it makes assumptions about the impact of the
imperfect information on the parties’ subjective probabilities of the court’s decision on
liability and the likelihood that the other party will accept a settlement offer rather than
litigate.
91. Perhaps the most significant missing information is the delay risk factor γ, the
probability that the litigation delay will cause the deal to crater.
92. For simplicity, this Article assumes that the agency anticipates a zero probability that
the merger proposal will be abandoned rather than litigated, a condition that is satisfied if
П(M) > 0.
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as given and ignores deterrence effects, the agency’s policies will have
effects on the structure of future proposed mergers.
With imperfect information and positive litigation costs, the agency’s
short-run optimal settlement demand balances the benefits and costs of
making a marginally tougher settlement demand. The first-order condition
can be stated formally as follows:
W(S*) – (1 – γ)[p(ŷ)W(ŷ) – C] = –aW’(S*)/a’

(3)

Intuitively, the agency has the incentive to choose the settlement demand
that equates the marginal benefit to the marginal cost. This tradeoff can be
stated in the form of a marginal risk-reward ratio. The term on the righthand side reflects the marginal risk-reward tradeoff. The reward is the
marginal increase in expected welfare, –aW’(S). The risk is the marginal
reduction in the likelihood that the settlement will be accepted, a’(S). The
larger the ratio of marginal reward to marginal risk, the more the agency’s
incentive will be to demand a more aggressive settlement commitment.
Equation (3) also explains why the agency may take a less aggressive
position toward more anticompetitive mergers, that is, those with more
negative W(ŷ). While the likelihood of a false acquittal, p(ŷ), will be lower
for such mergers, the expected welfare harm, p(ŷ)W(ŷ)<0, may become
more negative. In this situation, the agency would have more to fear from
an aggressive settlement demand. As a result, the agency would have the
incentive to be more accommodating by demanding a weaker settlement,
S*.

